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RITA M. JAMES*
The specific concern of this paper is to describe jurors' reactions
to expert psychiatric testimony in a criminal trial involving a charge
of incest and a plea of insanity. Placing the question in its broadest
context, the practice of experts appearing in the court has given rise
to two widely recognized problems: How much authority should be
delegated to the experts; and, how much should the trial procedures
be changed so as to make more professionally responsible the court-
rooms' utilization of the expert testimony. In this article we shall
address ourselves to a less well recognized question, but one which
we believe has a logical priority over the two indicated above, so long
as one assumes continuation of existing court procedures. Namely, we
need to know how jurors interpret and act upon the psychiatric testi-
mony they receive before we can reasonably recommend modifications
of current practice. In this connection we shall comment briefly on
the historical background and the essence of the current controversy
over expert testimony and report some tentative findings from research
based on the American jury system.
I
The practice of the courts of calling in experts to advise them
on matters not generally known to the average person has been fol-
lowed, certainly in English courts, for well over four centuries. Ini-
tially, the experts were used as technical assistants to the court, rather
than as witnesses. The judge summoned experts to inform him about
technical matters; and, he then determined whether or not the in-
formation should be passed on to the jury. By the middle of the
17th century, when the finding of the facts had become the exclusive
province of the jury, the practice of the court-appointed expert
reporting to the judge was also abandoned; and instead the expert
was called as a witness by the parties involved in the dispute.' In
one of the more famous of the early cases Sir Thomas Brown, gen-
erally reputed to be the most eminent physician of his time, testified
before an English court in a witchcraft trial. He stated that there
were such things as witches and that in his opinion the three persons
pointed out to him in court "were bewitched."
* Research Associate, Law School, and Assistant Professor, Sociology Department,
University of Chicago.
1 For a more detailed account see: Wigmore, A Students' Textbook of the Law of
Evidence 1-23 and 125-160 (1935); Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law
205-209 (1952); Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law (1953).
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Concerning the current controversy, let us hear first from the
psychiatrists. Perhaps the chief complaints of the psychiatrists lie
in the adversary nature of the proceedings. They assert that the
atmosphere of the courtroom is incompatible in both aims and pro-
cedure with the usual surroundings and expectations associated with
the role of the physician. The courtroom resembles neither the exam-
ining room nor the laboratory. The expectations involved in the
patient-doctor relationship are such that the doctor rarely hears
either his authority or his technical skill questioned. It is also a
relationship in which both participants believe that the doctor will
act responsibly.' However, as Guttmacher and Weihofen have indi-
cated,
A trial is not a scientific investigation, it is not a search for ob-jective truth. The doctor who undertakes to go into court to
testify as an expert witness must bear in mind that he is stepping
squarely into the middle of a fight.3
In addition the psychiatrists note that in the courtroom the expert is
subject to cross-examination; that he may be asked to give categorical
replies on matters that he believes are heavily shaded by special cir-
cumstances or unique events. He may hear his own opinions com-
pared with those of a colleague, whom he knows to be less competent
in the area in which he is testifying.
The expert may be asked to state his opinion on hypothetical
questions which he believes have no bearing on the particular pro-
ceeding, or indeed which may illustrate a point that is contradictory
to the case at hand. He may find that his attempts to present a full
clinical account of the nature of the defendants symptoms are ob-
jected to as irrelevant; and instead he may be asked to state his views
on matters that he believes are non-related both to his own area of
expertise and to the nature of the case. Questions concerning the
defendant's sense of responsibility, and his understanding of right
from wrong are usually directed to the medical expert. As Dr.
Guttmacher stated in a special issue of the University of Chicago Law
Review commemorating the Durham decision,
Most psychiatrists who have had courtroom experience feel that
they have been as greatly hampered from giving honest and effec-
tive assistance to the court by the methods and rules of legal proce-
dure as they have been by working in the M'Naghten strait
jacket.4
2 For a fuller discussion of the patient-doctor relationship, see Parsons, The Social
Systems 428-479 (1951).
3 Guttmacher & Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 205.
4 Guttmacher, "The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329
(1955).
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So much for the psychiatrists' side of the story; how do lawyers
view the problem? Even before the expert takes the stand, the lawyer
may be fearful that the psychiatrist's orientation, his view of human
nature, of the origins of conforming behavior in contrast to criminal
behavior, may be so far removed from the legal orientation that his
opinion can have no relevance for the ongoing trial.
A frequently cited source of concern for the lawyer is the belief
that, unless the function of the expert is carefully delineated, he could,
by the combined effects of his general prestige and his detailed technical
knowledge, virtually dictate to the jury the outcome of the case. While
the lawyer may be fearful of the potential influence of the psychiatrist,
he may be also somewhat skeptical of the "scienticity" of the disci-
pline he represents. The lawyer may be dismayed by the open, and
at times bitter, conflicts that have been waged in the courtroom
between proponents of "different schools of psychiatry." He has
witnessed what in the past, especially in major criminal trials, was
not an infrequent occurence, that of heated intra-professional con-
troversies between psychiatrists called by the opposing sides.5
For many members of the bar, the problem becomes one of a
control of power, even when it is in the hand of a benevolent repre-
sentative. The expert, as many lawyers have indicated, should be
available when needed, but in a situation in which he clearly performs
as a witness whose credibility is subject to the usual scrutiny of the
jury.
This brief review of the attitudes of practicing lawyers and
psychiatrists to the expert's performance in the courtroom has served
as an introduction to the major concern of this paper. The comments
of the experts are directed primarily to one audience, the jury. How
does this body of judges evaluate the performance they have heard?
Before discussing our results, a brief description of the larger re-
search project and of the data collecting procedures shall be presented.
II
The research reported here is part of a much larger study of
the American jury system that has been in progress at the Law
School of the University of Chicago since 1953. In carrying out this
study a variety of methods have been employed from the analysis of
5 At the present time at least twenty states have statutes which authorize the court
to appoint experts and report. The same provision is also found in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. As the practice of court-appointed experts becomes more general,
perhaps one of the sources of difficulty, that of partisanship among the experts, will be
substantially reduced. For a full discussion of this see Wigmore, A Students' Textbook
of the Law of Evidence (1935) and Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law
(1952).
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historical documents concerning the origins of the jury system to the
carrying out of intensive interviews in the homes of each of the
twelve jurors who had recently deliberated together on a case to the
presentation of recorded trials based on real cases for the considera-
tion of jurors who are serving on their regular period of jury duty.
These recorded trials then are replicated before a number of different
juries. The results of these various lines of research are to be published
in a series of separate volumes.6 The present paper draws its data
solely from the experimental jury studies.
We have listed below the steps involved in the experimental
procedure.
1. An experimental transcript is prepared modeled on an actual
transcript that is condensed to last 60 to 90 minutes.
2. The experimental trial is recorded, and the parts of the at-
torneys and the principals in the case are acted out by mem-
bers of the law school staff. The aim of the recorded trial
is not to produce good drama; the recorded trial has the slow-
ness and tedium of a day in court.
3. With the cooperation of the judges of the court regular
jurors are drawn from the jury pools of three metropolitan'
areas: Chicago, St. Louis and Minneapolis. Jurors are as-
signed to this case as part of their regular period of service.
4. Before the trial each juror is asked to fill out a questionnaire
which elicits much the same information as that acquired
during an extensive voir dire or pre-trial examination.
5. The jurors listen to a recorded trial.
6. After the trial, but before the deliberation, each juror is asked
to state his own verdict.
7. The jurors begin their deliberation, which is recorded. They
are told at the outset that their deliberation is being recorded
and that while their verdict can in no way affect the principals
in the case, the judges of this court are interested in the
result of the experiment for guidance in policy-making de-
cisions.
6 Some of the materials already published reflecting the nature of the research have
been cited below. Broeder, "The Function of the Jury: Facts or Fiction?," U. Chi. L.
Rev. 386 (1954) ; Strodtbech and Mann, "Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberation,"
19 Sociometry 1-11 (1956); Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, "Social Status in Jury
Deliberations," 22 American Sociological Review 713-719 (1957); James, "Competency
in Jury Deliberations," 64 American Journal of Sociology 563-570 (1959); Kalven,
"The Jury, The Law and Personal Awards," 19 Ohio St. L.J. 158 (1957); James,
"Jurors' Assessment of Criminal Responsibility," Social Problems (1959) ; Zeisel, Kalven
and Bucholz, Delay in the Court (1959). Among the books planned for future publica-
tion, one general volume on the experimental jury studies and a second volume dealing
specifically with the insanity trials will be included.
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8. After the deliberation, each juror is asked to fill out another
questionnaire concerning his reactions to the trial and the
deliberation. He is also asked to state if his own verdict
differs or agrees with that of the group. Thus, on three dif-
ferent occasions: before the deliberation, as part of the group
verdict, and again after the deliberation, individual verdicts
are obtained.
The transcript used for this experiment was adapted from the
case of United States v. Claison King,7 heard originally in the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia in 1956. The recorded trial,
renamed The People v. Jason Lunt was played before sixty-eight
juries in three jurisdictions, Chicago, St. Louis and Minneapolis. As
of this time, fifteen of these deliberations have been transcribed and
their content analyzed." These fifteen deliberations, along with the
questionnaire responses of the entire sample of 816 jurors (68 x 12)
form the basis of this paper.
A brief summary of the trial appears below.
The defendant, Jason Lunt, a lieutenant in the Fire Depart-
ment, lived with his wife and children, two sons and two daughters,
in a metropolitan city on the East Coast. Until the time of his
trial the defendant had had no previous history of criminal in-
dictments or mental illness. The series of events leading to his
arrest were initiated by his younger daughter who, upon being
approached for sexual intercourse two days in succession, went to
the police. It is stated that his wife was aware of the incestuous
relationships for some time and that she never reported the situa-
tion; nor did she testify during the trial.
A series of lay witnesses were called by the prosecution. They
included the defendant's two daughters, with whom he readily
admitted having had sexual intercourse during the past fourteen
years. The arresting detective, an old family friend and former
associate at the Fire Department, and the Deputy Fire Chief tes-
tified that until the incidents reported in this trial were made public
it was their belief that the defendant was living a normal life with
the members of his family. In defense cross-examination it ap-
peared that the defendant had been erratic in his work at the
Fire Department, and at the time of his arrest had been home on
sick leave ordered by the physician attached to the Fire De-
partment.
The two psychiatrists called by the defense testified that the
defendant was suffering from paraphiliac neurosis, which they
claimed could be traced to unresolved oedipal tensions. In addition
they believed that the defendant's total lack of affect or involve-
ment with his present situation was an indication of mental dis-
7 United States v. Claison King, Docket Number 665-55 (D.C. 1956).
8 The deliberations transcribed thus far were randomly selected from the three
jurisdictions.
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order. There was a history covering some ten to fifteen years in
which the defendant was drinking heavily. At no time did the
doctors indicate that the defendant was suffering from a psychosis,
and on cross-examination they explicitly stated that he was not.
The final witness for the prosecution called in rebuttal was a
psychiatrist who had neither examined nor seen the patient before
his appearance in the courtroom. He testified that "paraphiliac
neurosis" was not a mental, but an emotional disturbance.
In the full research design two experimental variables were
included: one was concerned with the rule of law and the other with
expert psychiatric testimony. The rules of law that the jurors re-
ceived from the judge were systematically varied so that one-third
of the jurors were instructed along the lines of the traditional M'Nagh-
ten, or right from wrong version, one-third along the lines of the
more recent Durham, or product of mental disease formula, and one-
third received "no instructions," or no specific criterion concerning
the insanity plea. In addition, two versions of the psychiatric testi-
mony were presented. Half the juries heard what we have labeled
"model" expert testimony. In this version an attempt was made to
present a detailed clinical history of the defendant's illness from
infancy until the time of his indictment. Along with the detailed
account we sought to present testimony which was as free of techni-
cal jargon as ideally could be expected from a medical diagnosis.
In the second version, heard by the remaining half of the juries,
more "typical" psychiatric testimony was prepared, in which little
attempt was made either to present a developmental picture of the
defendant's illness or to delete the rather rich spiinkling of technical
vocabulary usually heard in such accounts.
The following is an excerpt from the testimony of the first de-
fense psychiatrist. It may serve as an illustration of the "model"
version. Dr. Weinstein is being questioned on direct examination.
Q. Doctor, could you recreate for us, perhaps in some detail,
a picture of the defendant's illness as you see it?
A. As is the usual practice in psychiatric examinations, in
the initial interviews I sought to obtain an intensive case history
of the patient's life, placing special emphasis on his very early
childhood experiences. In this case, I would say that the defend-
ant's earliest childhood experiences have resulted in a situation in
which he still carries around with him deep conflicts and anxieties
concerning his relationship with his mother. Now, of course, these
conflicts and anxieties are deeply repressed, that is, the defendant
is not aware of them; he does not by any means understand that
his infantile experiences are causing problems for him today. To
be more specific, let me tell you a little of the defendant's child-
hood experience. Would that be all right?
Mr. HOUSTON: Yes, Doctor, go right ahead.
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The WITNESS: Jason Lunt's father either died or deserted
his family, we are not sure which, when the patient was six months
old, and from then on until the time his mother remarried (the
defendant was then six years old), the patient slept in the same
bed with his mother. Until the patient's sixth year there were no
other adult males in the home with whom the patient could estab-
lish a father-son relationship. At the time of the mother's pro-
posed remarriage the defendant was extremely upset and protested
bitterly to his mother against the marriage. Now it is generally
believed that the oedipus complex, which in boys is represented
as love for the mother and both identification and hate for the
father figure, starts in the third year of life and reaches its climax
in about the fifth year. Thus, at the height of the patient's oedipal
attachment to his mother, he was forced for the first time to share
his mother's attentions with a man with whom he had no previous
contact. The step-father, as it turned out, was a stern, quiet man
who exhibited no love or interest in his stepson. The patient was
unable to identify with this man as a father figure. Two years
later, when the defendant was eight years old, a half brother was
born, of whom he was extremely jealous.
The patient's history indicates that he practiced masturbation
from the time he was three years old. Young boys, employed by his
mother in her confectionery business, I believe it was, first intro-
duced him to this practice by so engaging themselves in his pres-
ence. Also, when the patient was between the ages of three and
six, his mother, as part of her confectionery business, ran a dance
hall; and it was there that the patient had an opportunity to
observe patrons of the establishment engage in perverse sexual acts.
Q. Now, Doctor, would you say that these experiences which
occurred in the early years of the defendant's life can account for
the defendant's behavior when he is a grown man?
A. I would say that they can and do. Let me explain it in
this way. Experiences that occur in early childhood constitute the
groundwork from which the sexuality of the adult subsequently
develops. Any adult who is blocked in his adult sexuality falls
back to infantile sexuality as a substitute, because the child ex-
periences his sexuality with the same emotions the adult feels
toward his.
An overcoming of oedipal strivings, and replacement by adult
sexuality, is the prerequisite for normality, whereas an unconscious
clinging to oedipal tendencies characterizes the neurotic mind.
Anything that increases fears and thus increases sexual repressions
causes disturbances in the subsequent overcoming of the oedipus
complex. Furthermore, the oedipus complex is most outspoken
in only children, and special complications may be present when
there is less than a three family group; this is, when one of the
parents is not present.
Now, if I could just go on a little longer to fill in some more
details from the patient's history.
Mr. HOUSTON: Yes, Doctor, please do.
The WITNESS: The patient met his wife soon after he
entered high school, and they began dating steadily. A few months
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after they graduated from high school they were married. The
patient had dated no other girl during this period. About two or
three months after the couple were married, their first child was
born. Since then they have had three other children, so that their
family consists of two boys and two girls. There appears to be no
indication of any abnormality in the patient's relationship with his
sons, or in the sons' behavior generally. The patient claims that
his wife has always been frigid, and that intercourse with her was
no source of release for him. He also insists that he is over-sexed.
He had continued masturbation, though with considerable guilt,
until he was past forty years of age.
Q. Now, Doctor, from all the information that you have
acquired, what are your conclusions?
A. I would say that Mr. Lunt is what in psychiatric terms
we call a psycho-neurotic. Now, by the term psychoneurosis, I
mean to describe someone who, on the whole, manages to conform
to the demands of ordinary living, but who is the victim of his
own inner conflicts. These conflicts usually show themselves in a
variety of ways, for example, the person may become overanxious,
he may have unjustified fears, or he may suffer from obsessions and
compulsions. But essentially such a person appears to be all right
even in the eyes of people with whom he may have daily contact,
in the sense that he appears to be in touch with reality.
Q. Doctor, given the patient's personal background and ex-
periences, would it be your opinion that behavior such as the type
described in this case is a likely outcome?
A. Well, it's always an extremely difficult task to predict or
foresee from a person's childhood just what particular behavioral
patterns will result when he is an adult, but I would say in this
patient's incestuous relationship is not an unexpected result.
The following section, occurring at approximately the same point
in the defense's examination of Dr. Weinstein, is illustrative of the
"typical" version.
Q. Would you kindly tell us what you have learned on the
basis of the examination?
A. It is my opinion that Mr. Lunt is a psychoneurotic patient
of long standing. I cannot state specifically the exact date that it
started but a total review of his history leads me to conclude that
it is of some years standing. The patient's early developmental
history indicates that because of the death or desertion of his
father, very strong emotional dependence developed between
mother and son. This is undoubtedly an important factor in the
development of the patient's neurosis which led to his abnormal
sexual behavior. The unhealthy state of affairs may be charac-
terized as an oedipus complex.
Along with this, we have the appearance, when the patient
was six years old, of a cold rejecting stepfather, thus causing the
patient's fears to reach the force of castration anxiety; and this
was a further crippling influence insofar as his sexual development
was concerned. I might add that one often finds such a background
in paraphiliac neurotics.
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And I believe that this condition existed during the period of
the alleged offense.
When this research is reported in full, interest will be centered
primarily on the intereaction between rule of law and psychiatric
testimony. However, for purposes of this report,9 we shall not at-
tempt to evaluate the effects that the rule of law combined with each
of the psychiatric versions have on jury decisions. Instead we shall
simply provide the reader with a taste of the nature of the jurors'
reactions to psychiatric testimony over the whole design.
Since this report relies so heavily on the data drawn from the
experimental study, a word about the realism of the experience is in
order. Perhaps a weakness of this procedure is that the jurors do
not actually see a trial enacted before them; they can only listen to
a recorded version. But even this might have its virtues when we
note that the opportunity of presenting exactly the same stimulus
before a number of different juries is guaranteed by the recorded trial
in a way in which it could never be if the trial had to be re-enacted
each time. The fact that the subjects participating in the experiment
are persons serving on their regular period of jury service; that they
are sent to the experiment by the court; and are instructed by the
judge as to the nature of their task; are factors which add immeasur-
ably to the realism of the experience. In addition, the trial that they
hear is taken from a real case; the parts are not read by professional
actors; 10 the recording has none of the style of a television or radio
dramatization. Rather, the proceedings they hear attempt to capture
the slowness of tempo, the tedium and much of the repetition that is
heard in the courtroom. We have listened to and played before legal
and other professional persons literally hundreds of these delibera-
tions, based on recorded trials; and even among those who at the
outset were most skeptical there was consensus in noting the intensity
and sense of involvement that left little doubt both as to the realism
and meaningfulness of the experience for the participants.
o The incest trial reported here represents the second attempt at obtaining jurors'
reactions to a plea of insanity in a criminal case. In the first instance, the original
Durham trial was replicated before twenty juries. Half heard the trial under M'Naghten,
the other half under Durham. In that experiment no variations in the psychiatric testi-
mony were introduced. The full results of both experiments will be reported in a forth-
coming volume on "Jurors' Reactions to Alternative Rules of Law in Insanity Cases."
1) At an earlier time, one of the versions of the first insanity trial was prepared
by using a group of professional actors. The stereotyped notion, for example, of how
a prosecutor sounds when he cross-examines a witness, made the trial sound like a
soap opera.
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III
The first cluster of data comes from the questionnaires distributed
after the deliberation. Jurors were asked to respond to a series of
items concerning the expert psychiatric testimony. The first group
of questions sought reactions on the following points:
A-Did the jurors find helpful the testimony of the two psychia-
trists called by the defense?
B-Did they want more information from the experts?
C-Did they believe that the language the experts used in testi-
fying was too technical?
It was anticipated that the reactions of the jurors might be
related to one or both of the following factors: The version of the
psychiatric testimony they had heard; and their disposition to believe
the defendant was guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Con-
cerning the first factor, it was expected that jurors who heard the
psychiatrists present the longer, more detailed, and relatively straight-
forward description of the defendants sysmptoms would be more
likely to find the expert testimony helpful; would have less need for
further information; and would be less likely to believe that the
language employed by the experts was too technical.
On the relationship between verdicts and the above questions,
it was thought that the jurors who found the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity generally would be more appreciative and, perhaps,
less critical of the experts' testimony. They might be less likely to
believe that additional- information was needed or that the language
employed by the experts was too technical.
Let us now examine the data. Concerning item A, about three
quarters, or 74 per cent, of the jurors indicated that they found the
testimony helpful. No differences were observed between jurors who
heard the "model" as compared with those who heard the "typical"
testimony; or between jurors who found guilty and those who found
not guilty by reason of insanity.
The responses to item B had much the same flavor as those
given to item A. On this question, two thirds of the jurors indicated
no expressed need for further information. Jurors who heard the
"typical" version of the psychiatric testimony expressed no greater
need for more information than those who heard the longer and more
detailed "model" version.
As indicated in Table 1, shown below, of the one-third minority
who did want more information, the need was significantly greater
among jurors who believed the defendant was not guilty by reason of
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insanity; 44 per cent in contrast to 29 per cent for the guilty-prone
jurors.
TABLE 1
PER CENT OF JURORS INDICATING THAT THEY WANTED MORE INFORmATION FROu
T Two DEFENSE PSYCHIATRISTS, BY EDUCATION AND VERDICTS*
Verdict Grade High College Combined
NGI 35 46 48 44
(62)** (139) (58) (259)
Guilty 26 29 30 29
(112) (276) (164) (552)
Combined 29 35 35 33
(174) (415) (222) (811)
* [X,2 df (.99) = 9.2, X2 = 16.97 P <.01.]
** Frequencies are in parentheses.
When the jurors were divided into different educational categories,
it may be noted that this relationship between a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity and a desire for more information was dis-
tributed relatively evenly across each of the educational groupings.
Jurors' responses to item C followed much the same pattern in
that slightly more than two thirds, or 69 per cent, of the responses
expressed no dissatisfaction with the language employed by the ex-
perts. Jurors who heard the "model" version were only slightly less
critical than those who heard the "typical" testimony. Of the former,
71 per cent did not believe that the language was too technical, while
of the latter 65 per cent indicated that they did not find the language
too technical. These differences are not statistically significant.
As shown in Table 2, listed below, the belief of the jurors con-
cerning the guilt or insanity of the defendant was not a significant
factor.
TABLE 2
PERCENT OF JURORS INDICATING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF Tm DEFENSE PsYc RIssTS
WAs Too TECHNICAL, BY EDUCATION* AND VERDICTS
Verdict Grade High College Combined
NGI 39 35 28 34
(62)** (139) (58) (259)
Guilty 37 32 20 29
(112) (276) (164) (552)
Combined 38 33 22 31
(174) (415) (222) (811)
* [X 2 2 df (.95) = 6.0, X2 = 8.97 P <.05.]
** Frequencies are in parentheses.
Of the 31 per cent who found the language too technical, 34 per cent
were jurors who believed the defendant not guilty by reason of in-
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sanity and 29 per cent were jurors who believed the defendant guilty.
It may be noted that of this 31 per cent, a significantly high contribu-
tion was made by jurors with a grade school education: 38 per cent
in contrast to only 22 per cent for the college educated jurors.
In summary, the responses of at least two thirds of the jurors
to these rather general questions indicated that they had a favorable,
if somewhat uncritical reaction to the experts' performance. The re-
sponses did not indicate that there was a systematic tendency to view
the model testimony any more favorably or less critically than the
typical testimony. It is interesting that, in contrast to our expecta-
tions, the jurors who found the defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity were no more appreciative of the experts' performance and
they did indicate a greater desire for more information than the
guilty-prone jurors. It would almost seem that, having gone along
with the psychiatrists' views on the matter, they would have liked
even more information in order to further substantiate their own
beliefs. As we move to an examination of more specific questions, we
shall see if the trends reported here are substantiated.
The next series of items sought to compare jurors' evaluation of
expert, in contrast to lay, testimony as the testimony might have
influenced their decision in the case. The total number of witnesses
appearing for both sides was eight: four lay and one expert witness
were called by the prosecution, and two expert witnesses were called
by the defense. The defendant did not take the stand but the state-
ment he gave immediately after he was picked up by the police was
read into the record by the prosecuting attorney.
Concerning the order and length of testimony, the prosecution
opened his case by calling the two complaining witnesses; the testi-
mony of Henrietta, the younger daughter, preceded that of Roberta,
the older one. They in turn were followed by a family friend and
former colleague in the fire department, and finally by Detective
McKay, the arresting officer. For the defense, Dr. Weinstein pre-
ceded Dr. Fairchild. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled the family
friend, then the detective, and for the first time he called the deputy
fire chief who was also the defendant's immediate superior in the
municipal fire department, and finally, also for the first time, an ex-
pert witness, a psychiatrist, Dr. Grant. In both the "model" and
"typical" versions, the combined testimony of the two defense psychia-
trists was the longest, with Dr. Weinstein's taking slightly longer than
Dr. Fairchild's. Next in order of length of time on the witness stand
was the deputy fire chief, followed by the arresting officer, the younger
daughter, the family friend, the older daughter, and finally the govern-
ment psychiatrist.
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On the questionnaire, next to the names of each of the witnesses,
the jurors were asked: How important was this testimony in causing
you to hold the opinion you have? In response, the jurors were to
check one of the following:
- very important
- fairly important
- not important.
In Table 3, shown below, jurors were divided into three groups:
those who rated the testimony of all, or from five to seven of the wit-
nesses" very important; those who rated three or four very important;
and those who rated two or less of the witnesses' testimony very im-
portant. The reason for this division was to differentiate into rela-
tively homogeneous groups those jurors who were likely to have a
restrained or critical reaction to all the testimony they heard, those
who were intermediate in their critical assessment, and those who
found importance in everything they heard.
TABLE 3
A CoPARISON OF THE PER CENT OF JURORS RATING ExPERT AND LAY TESTImONY
VERY IMPORTANT
Number of
Witnesses
Juror Expert Lay
Rated 1st 2nd Deputy
Very Def Def Govt Two Arrest Fire
Important Psych Psych Psych Dau's Friend Officer Chief Combined
5-7 91 92 89 91 80 76 73 85
(271)*
3-4 66 60 45 70 46 28 37 54
(326)
0-2 20 17 10 44 19 7 14 25
(215)
Combined 62 60 50 70 50 39 43 57
(812)
* Frequencies are in parentheses.
We note, from Table 3, that jurors in each of the groups found
the testimony of the daughters, that is the prosecution's principal
witnesses, equally or more important than they found the testimony
of the psychiatrists. However, only among the jurors in the "0-2
category" are the differences in favor of the daughters of a significant
magnitude.
It might be of interest to compare the importance ratings re-
11 The jurors were asked to make one rating for the testimony of both daughters.
In total, then, there were seven witnesses to be rated.
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ceived by the witnesses with the length of their appearance on the
stand. In the preparation of the experimental transcript an attempt
was made to delete as much of the repetitious material as possible
without, of course, seriously jeopardizing the realism of the experience.
It may be assumed that all of the testimony that was retained was
considered relevant to some degree.
Length of
Time on Importance
Stand Witness Rating
3 Both daughters 12  1
1 First Defense Psychiatrist 2
2 Second Defense Psychiatrist 3
6, 7 Friend-Government Psychiatrist 4Y, 43/
4 Deputy Fire Chief 6
5 Arresting Officer 7
The testimony of the two defense psychiatrists was rated second
and third in importance; it was exceeded only by that of the com-
plaining witnesses. 3 The expert testimony, however, was rated no
more important than might be anticipated if one were estimating the
importance of the psychiatrists' influence from the amount of time
that the jurors were exposed to their views. Also, if the percentage of
very important ratings received by the defense psychiatrists were
compared with the combined row per cents that appear in the final
column (85, 54, 25) in each of the three juror categories, the differ-
ence between the psychiatrists and the combined per cents is only
slightly in favor of the experts.
In Table 4, on page 89, the jurors' ratings of the experts in
the "model" and "typical" versions were compared. The expectation
was that the jurors would differentiate between the "model" and
"typical" versions, such that the defense psychiatrists would receive
a higher percentage of very important ratings from jurors who heard
the "model" version. No changes were made in the testimony of the
government psychiatrist; his ratings were included only for purposes
of comparison.
It may be noted that the testimony of the defense psychiatrists
was not perceived as being any more important in the "model" than it
was in the "typical" version. If anything, there is a slight indication
of a difference in the opposite direction, but it is far from significant.
While it appeared from the jurors' responses to the first set of
12 This ranking represents the combined testimony of both daughters.
13 It should he noted that the two daughters were the first two witnesses to appear
in the trial; and it may be that a primacy factor is operative, thereby causing the
jurors to remember their testimony more cearly than they remember the testimony
of the other, later witnesses.
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items on the questionnaire that they were generally favorable if
somewhat uncritical in their appraisal of the expert psychiatric testi-
mony, it now appears that they allowed the experts no greater influ-
ence on their final decision than might have been expected from the
relative amount of time devoted to the psychiatric testimony during
the trial.
TABLE 4
PER CENT OF JURORS RATING TH EXPERT TESTIMONY VERY IMPORTANT,
BY VERsIoN oF TRIAL
Number of
Witnesses Model Typical
Rated 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Very Def Def Govt Def Def Govt
Important Psych Psych Psych Psych Psych Psych Combined
5-7 92 91 90 91 92 88 91
(271)*
3-4 65 62 49 66 59 41 59
(326)
0-2 24 18 9 16 16 10 17
(215)
Combined 60 57 48 64 62 52 59
(812)
* Frequencies are in parentheses.
However, it might well be that asking subjects to respond to
items on a questionnaire so structures the situation that the respond-
ents do not feel free to report their own feelings. Perhaps, if we turn
to an examination of the transcripts of the deliberations and note the
verbatim comments of the jurors, a more complete picture of the
jurors' reactions to the experts' testimony can be reported. One word
of caution: In presenting, as we do at this time, only those portions
of the deliberations in which expert testimony is explicitly mentioned,
we have not exhausted the relevance of the deliberations for this
topic. It may be equally as important to indicate the other sources
of reference that jurors rely upon in their assessment of the defend-
ant's behavior when the expert testimony is not discussed: Such fac-
tors, for example, as having had direct contact with institutionalized
persons. But, here again, a full and systematic analysis of the
content of the deliberations must await publication of the whole range
of insanity cases.
IV
The main brunt of the jurors' discussion of the expert psychiatric
testimony consisted of a detailed examination of what the doctors
included or failed to include in their testimony, and the implications of
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this testimony for the plea of insanity offered by the defense. That is,
did the testimony provide adequate guidance to a body of laymen dele-
gated the responsibility of determining whether or not the defendant
should be declared legally insane? The following are quotations
selected from the fifteen typed protocols of the deliberations presently
available. The first excerpt may serve to establish the general tone
of the jurors' comments. It was taken from a jury that heard the
"typical" expert testimony, and the comment was made after the
discussion had been going on for about half an hour.
Here you have two psychologists, psychiatrists, who knew and
worked with the man, say that he is insane. I don't just have to
sit here and say that the man isn't. When two medical men, of
course you don't have to believe in doctors, some people don't.
Secondly there are people who do not believe in psychiatrists, but
I personally do and I wouldn't ever put a man in prison, when
psychiatrists get up and say that the man is emotionally disturbed,
when he is sick. Is there anybody in this room that doesn't be-
lieve in psychiatry? That's the whole thing in my estimation. It's
whether or not you are going to take the word of these two men,
who are well known and are admired in the field, and have excellent
jobs. They are impartial. They're working for the county hospital.
Are you going to take their word, or are you going to sit there and
say that we know. We don't even know this man. They worked
with him, they both say that he is mentally disturbed. If you don't
take that as proof, I don't know what you are going to do. I mean
to me, in other words, if you don't find him not guilty by reason
of insanity, you're sitting here disregarding the two psychiatrists
in the case.
A few minutes later, in the same deliberation, another juror responded.
What I'm trying to say is just because these two people are edu-
cated and they are way up over our heads that we have to accept
what they say as truth and that's it. In other words, they would be
deciding for us, then we are not deciding for ourselves what is right
in this particular case.
A third juror interrupted to agree:
If that's the case, this case shouldn't ever have gone to a jury. I
mean that we should have to depend upon men specialized in the
field of psychiatry to judge this man.
The second juror continued:
That's right, you don't need a jury if you are going to take two
doctors' words and say that this man is insane. Why do you need
a jury?
During the trial, in cross-examination both defense psychiatrists
had insisted that insanity was a judicial term and involved a deter-
mination which they "did not feel qualified to make." This statement
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was the source of considerable puzzlement in practically every deliber-
ation. One juror expressed it this way:
What I don't clearly understand is are we talking in terms of legal
insanity; or technical insanity; or medical insanity, the jargon of
the psychiatrists? In the jargon of the psychiatrists, they do not
declare him insane; they do not associate this man with the term
that they generally associate with insanity, people who do not have
control over their actions. The word psychosis came up, but they
do not identify this man with having a psychosis, he had a mental
disorder.
Later in the deliberation the same juror commented:
My argument is that the experts do not associate a mental illness
to this man that has significance in terms of insanity. He had a
mental disorder but was it such that the man was not responsible
for his actions?
For some jurors the fact that the psychiatrists could not state
whether or not the defendant was insane, was a reflection of their
own competence and perhaps of the competence of the entire field.
One juror expressed it this way:
Don't you think doctors with such high standards as they should
have would have been able to tell you a little more surely, whether
they thought he was insane or not?
Or, as several jurors observed in another deliberation:
As far as I can see, the defense psychiatrists didn't come right out
and say that they thought the man was insane. They wouldn't say
that.
No, they did--didn't. They didn't state it right out. They were
only giving ideas of their own which are never always correct.
Now when it comes to mental sickness, everyone has their own.
Mental sickness isn't insanity.
Perhaps the main point of discussion stimulated by the expert
testimony was the meaning of the distinction between neuroses and
psychoses. During the trial, each expert had testified that in his
opinion the defendant was not psychotic, but that he was suffering
from a psychoneurosis. What implications did the negative finding
re psychoses have on the jurors' determination of the sanity or insanity
of the defendant? One juror put it this way:
Didn't that one doctor testify that he had an outside practice and
that his whole practice practically was of people who had a neurosis.
They're jumpy, nervous, maybe they do funny kinds of things. But
you don't see his patients locked up in some institution do you?
Well this fellow has a neurosis, or say, he has a mental illness.
These other people they have a mental illness and they go to their
psychiatrist and get treatment. But you don't see them doing
irrational acts and maybe breaking windows or robbing stores.
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Or, another juror stated it:
Now the part that bothers me is the difference between psychoses
and neuroses and is a neuroses technically, does it technically come
under the heading of insanity? In the language that the experts
used, they associated psychosis with the word insanity. And they
said the defendant had a neurosis. This one doctor pointed out
that he was treating people from the outside world who had neu-
roses and who were carrying on their everyday business. Neurosis
is not an abnormal mental situation, most people are neurotic for
one reason or the other. If every one of us in this room went to a
psychiatrist for weeks they could find various strengths and weak-
nesses on our viewpoints on many subjects. I'm sure we would
fall under one or another type of category or classification in our
general mental outlook.
Or, still another juror made the following analysis:
Part of the thing that bothers me about this is that everyone of
us to some degree has a mental disorder. Anybody that likes the
Cardinals but doesn't like the Browns has a mental disorder be-
cause I like the Browns, you follow me? So in our different beliefs,
and I, oh, I raise my children differently than my neighbor raises
his, so there's something wrong with my neighbor. My only point is
that in the realm of the mind there is lots of room for differences of
thinking and behavior and patterns of organization. Technically,
none of the experts crossed the line and said that this man is in-
sane, is definitely insane. They said he had a mental disorder.
A problem especially interesting to trial lawyers is how jurors
assimilate conflicting expert opinion; and how in turn this reflects on
the status of the expert witness. Thus it, can one still depend upon
the testimony that has been "tinged by partisanship" to reflect the
accumulated knowledge represented by the particular discipline?
While the present trial does not provide the best opportunity for
examining jurors' reactions on this problem, in that although both
sides called "experts," the psychiatrist for the prosecution made al-
most a perfunctory appearance, having neither seen nor examined the
defendant before his testimony in the courtroom. It may still be of
some interest to observe jurors' reactions to the differences in con-
clusions expressed by the experts. One juror made the following as-
sessment of the situation:
You understand that there are apparently four different schools
of psychiatry, all of whom claim their school was right and the
other school wrong; and, although they have made progress in
psychiatry, I don't think they identified it as a precise science
as yet.
Another juror distinguished the testimony of each side in the follow-
ing way:
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The big factor in my mind was that the two psychiatrists who
testified that he was mentally deranged really examined the de-
fendant. The other one I think the other man was a brilliant man,
probably, but the other man definitely had not examined this
particular gentleman. I would have thought a lot more of his
testimony, I mean, I see no reason for disbelieving him, but I
would have thought a lot more of his testimony if he had examined
him. The other two doctors had examined him and that's an im-
portant difference in my opinion.
For some jurors, the testimony of the psychiatrist called by
the prosecution was shown to be inadequate under cross-examination
and therefore need not be given serious consideration in their delibera-
tion. The following is one such instance:
As I remember part of the testimony [the testimony of Dr. Grant],
the defense attorney was questioning the doctor and that doctor
said that sexual perversion is not necessarily insanity; but he said
it was disturbed emotions. Then the defense attorney asked what
the difference was and the doctor couldn't say.
Before concluding, we might discuss one other aspect of this
problem of jurors' evaluation of expert testimony. For those cases
in which expert knowledge has been introduced, to whom shall the
responsibility be delegated for deciding the issues in the case? In
this period of increased expertise and specialization, many criticisms
have been raised against the practice of laymen deciding matters
about which their knowledge can at best be only on the level of an
intelligent amateur. As indicated in the introductory comments in
this paper, the early practice of the courts followed the procedure
of having the experts serve almost as advisors to the bench. Somewhat
later, it was left to the discretion of the judge, whether or not he
would acquaint the members of the jury with the information he
had acquired from the experts. The procedure, as it is commonly
practiced today, is for each side to call the experts of his choice,
who then testify for the enlightenment of the jury. How do jurors,
as representatives of the general public, react to the idea of relin-
quishing their responsibility for deciding such cases? In this instance,
the specific question posed to the jurors was:
Which to you, is the best way of deciding what should be 'done
with a person who has committed a crime and pleads that he is
insane?
He should be tried before a jury, just like anyone else.
He should be tried before a judge.
He should be turned over by the court to psychiatrists and
they should determine what is to be done with him.
Only 7 per cent of the jurors selected the judge. The choice
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then was between a jury of laymen or a group of medical experts, and
between those two the jury was favored almost two to one. Of the
one third who were willing to delegate authority to the psychiatrists,
the jurors who found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity
exceeded the guilty-prone jurors to a significant extent. The strongest
support for the psychiatrists came from those jurors who found the de-
fendant not guilty by reason of insanity after listening to the "model"
psychiatric testimony.
TABLE 5
PER CENT FAVORING PSYCHIATRIST BY PSYCHIATRIC VERSION
AND JURORS' VERDICTS*
Verdict Model Typical Combined
NGI 45 36 41
(124)** (116) (240)
G 29 30 30
(242) (271) (513)
Combined 34 32 33
(366) (387) (753)
* [X? df (.99) = 6.6, X2 = 8.59 P < .01.1
** The frequencies (figures in parentheses) do not include the 57 jurors who se-
lected the judge.
But, perhaps the point to be emphasized is that two thirds of
the jurors were not ready to relinquish their responsibilities to an
expert body. Perhaps the following comment from one of the delibera-
tions captures some of the feelings surrounding this point.
Just because these doctors are educated and they are way up over
our heads, it doesn't mean that we have to accept what they say
as truth and that's it. In other words they would be deciding for
us. We would not be deciding for ourselves what is right in this
particular case. If that were so, then this case should never have
gone to a jury. I mean, then we would have to depend upon men
specialized in the field of psychiatry to judge this man. The judge
said that we could disregard their testimony, if we wanted to.
After all, you can't base your whole opinion on the fact that these
people have degrees.
V
In this article we have utilized the unusual opportunity of an
exposure to the actual protocols of deliberations in order to present
information on jurors' reactions to expert psychiatric testimony that
went beyond the responses obtained from questionnaires. The jurors
listened to a criminal trial involving a charge of incest and a plea of
insanity, in which the defense had relied solely on the testimony of two
psychiatrists. Both doctors had testified that the defendant was men-
tally ill for some period preceding the trial and the acts with which he
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was charged were not an unexpected result of his earlier experiences
In contrast, the prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of lay
witnesses, especially the testimony of the defendant's two daughters.
They did call as a final witness a psychiatrist who had not examined
the defendant and who testified very briefly.
In their reactions and evaluations of the expert testimony, the
jurors made several points. They distinguished the contributions
made by the defense and government psychiatrists. That is, they
acknowledged that a doctor's testimony not based on first hand knowl-
edge of the subject may not be worth as much as testimony which
was derived from direct contact. Generally speaking, most jurors
granted to the experts the recognition appropriate to their specialized
training and greater knowledge. Jurors did not, so far as can be
judged at this time, indicate any differences in their evaluation of
the "model" in contrast to the "typical" version of psychiatric testi-
mony. The longer, more detailed, straightforward account was not
perceived as being significantly more helpful or more influential than
the shorter and more technical "typical" version. Generally, jurors
indicated that they were impressed with the full scope of the experts'
performance on the stand. About three quarters of the jurors indi-
cated that the testimony was helpful, and two thirds did not believe
the language they employed was too technical or that more informa-
tion was needed. But as to the experts influencing the jurors insofar
as the verdict was concerned, this was another matter.
It was almost because the jurors recognized that these men were
experts, that they were members of a profession, that it gave the
jurors license to grant them a certain degree of deference which did
not also oblige them to accept the witnesses' statements as directives
for their own action. As experts, these witnesses had a position and a
view to represent, just as a member of the Chamber of Commerce
might present the businessman's view, or a union leader, the working
man's perspective. These witnesses represented the views of psychia-
try about criminals. It is suggested that for many of the jurors they
appeared as extreme and perhaps impractical views which, in the
final assessment, most jurors did not choose to accept. This interpre-
tation, concerning the failure of the experts to influence the jurors
in their ultimate decisions, that of finding the defendant guilty or
insane, is strongly supported by one statistic which we have delib-
erately delayed reporting: of the sixty-eight juries who heard and
deliberated the case, only nine, or 13 per cent, found the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity. In brief, 71 per cent of the juries in
finding the defendant guilty voted against the experts, and 16 per
cent were unable to arrive at a unanimous verdict.
